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ABSTRACT
We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of
indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept
of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in
tension with subjective Bayesianism.
1 The Argument
2 Some Objections Met
1 The Argument
Lewis ([1980]) put forward the following principle as a constraint on a
reasonable initial credence function P, which is taken to be a probability
function:
Principal principle: PðAjXEÞ ¼ x, where X says that the chance at time t of
proposition A is x and E is any proposition that is compatible with X and
admissible at time t.
The principal principle implies that if one’s evidence includes the proposition
that the chance at time t of A is x, then one should believe A to degree x, as
long as one’s other evidence, E, does not include anything that defeats this
ascription of rational belief. If x< 1 and E logically entails A then E is a
defeater, for instance, since by the laws of probability, PðAjXEÞ ¼ 1 6¼ x.
On the other hand, if E is a proposition entirely about matters of fact no
later than time t, then as a rule E is admissible and not a defeater (Lewis
[1980], pp. 92–6). It is also intuitively plausible that the following two
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conditions hold, where, henceforth, F is any proposition that is contingent
(neither necessarily true nor necessarily false) and atomic (not logically
complex)1:
Condition 1: If E is not a defeater and XE contains no information that
renders F relevant to A, then EF is not a defeater.
Condition 2: If E is not a defeater and XE contains no information relevant
to F, then EðA$ F Þ is not a defeater.
Consider an example in which there are two tests, an a-test and an f-test,
each of which has two possible outcomes, positive or negative. You are told
just that the chance of the a-test yielding a positive result is 0.8 (X). The
principal principle implies that you should believe that the a-test turns out
positive to degree 0.8, PðAjX Þ ¼ 0:8. By Condition 1, learning that the f-test
yields a positive outcome (F) should not defeat this application of the principal
principle, PðAjXF Þ ¼ 0:8, because there is no evidence linking F to A in
this example. By Condition 2, learning that the a-test is positive if and
only if the f-test is positive should not defeat the principal principle,
PðAjX ðA$ F ÞÞ ¼ 0:8, because although A$ F specifies a link between F
and A, there is no evidence concerning F here.
We shall take the claim that E is not a defeater to hold just when
PðAjXEÞ ¼ x ¼ PðAjX Þ. Moreover, we shall take the supposition that XE
contains no information that renders F relevant to A to imply that
PðAjFXEÞ ¼ PðAjXEÞ. Then Condition 1 provably holds:
Proposition 1
Suppose E is a non-defeater and XE contains no information that renders F
relevant to A. Then EF is a non-defeater.
Proof
PðAjFXEÞ ¼ PðAjXEÞ ¼ PðAjX Þ since E is a non-defeater. w
1 This restriction to contingent atomic propositions is required to ensure that F does not provide
information relevant to its own probability. The argument of this section does not go through in
general for propositions that contain such information. Examples of self-informative propos-
itions include the following: Necessarily true and false propositions should arguably be given a
credence of one and zero, respectively, even if they are not logically true (logically false, respec-
tively). A logically complex proposition such as ‘ticket number ninety-seven won a fair thou-
sand-ticket lottery with one winner’ should arguably be believed to degree 1/1000 or
thereabouts, in the absence of other information. A logically complex proposition that is a
conjunction of very many atomic propositions should arguably be given low credence, in pro-
portion to the number of conjuncts, in the absence of other information. In such cases,
Condition 1 and Condition 2 can fail. In the last case, for instance, Condition 2 cannot apply
since otherwise, if we take as Fs the logically complex propositions BC, B:C; :BC, and:B:C,
where B and C are atomic propositions, then Proposition 2 would have their probabilities sum
up to 2, instead of the value 1 forced by the axioms of probability.










It turns out that, under certain conditions, one should believe F to degree
0.5 under evidence XE:
Proposition 2
Suppose that E, EF and EðA$ F Þ are non-defeaters and that 0 < x < 1.
Then the principal principle implies that PðF jXEÞ ¼ 0:5.
Proof
Since both EF and EðA$ F Þ are non-defeaters,
PðAjFXEÞ ¼ PðAjðA$ F ÞXEÞ:
That these conditional probabilities are well defined implies that their condi-





PðA$ F jXEÞ :
Now PðF jAXEÞ ¼ PðA$ F jAXEÞ, so the numerators are equal. Each side of
the above equation is equal to PðAjFXEÞ ¼ x > 0 so the numerators are non-
zero. Therefore the denominators are equal,
PðF jXEÞ ¼ PðA$ F jXEÞ:
Hence,
PðF jXEÞ ¼ PðFAjXEÞ þ Pð:F:AjXEÞ
¼ PðAjFXEÞPðF jXEÞ þ 1 PðF j:AXEÞð ÞPð:AjXEÞ




¼ xPðF jXEÞ þ ð1 xÞ  PðF jXEÞð1 xÞ:
(Note in the above that Pð:AjXEÞ ¼ 1 x > 0.) Collecting terms,
2ð1 xÞPðF jXEÞ ¼ 1 x, so PðF jXEÞ ¼ 0:5. w
Now suppose that E is a non-defeater and XE contains no information
relevant to F or that renders F relevant to A. By Conditions 1 and 2, neither
EF nor EðA$ F Þ are defeaters. Hence by Proposition 2, PðF jXEÞ ¼ 0:5. But
this is a version of the principle of indifference, since it says that given a
suitable lack of information about F, one should believe F and :F to exactly
the same degree, under evidence XE. Indeed, since XE contains no informa-
tion relevant to F, PðF jXEÞ ¼ PðF Þ, so PðF Þ ¼ 0:5 too. Thus the principle of
indifference also holds for unconditional initial credences.
Although there is some debate about how the principal principle is best
formulated, it is perhaps fair to say that most philosophers who are concerned
with norms on rational degrees of belief endorse a version of the principal










principle. On the other hand, the principle of indifference is still viewed largely
with suspicion. The above considerations suggest that the Bayesian epistem-
ologist should either embrace both principles in line with objective
Bayesianism (see, for example, Williamson [2010]), or deny both principles
in line with radical subjectivism. Either way, the principal principle, as a half-
way house between radically subjective Bayesianism and objective
Bayesianism, becomes an unstable position.
Interestingly, this line of argument does not depend on the structure of the
proposition X. Exactly the same considerations apply to any principle that
seeks to constrain rational credence on the basis of some feature F of a prop-
osition X, in the presence of a proposition E that is a non-defeater:
Superprincipal principle: PðAjXEÞ ¼ x, where X relates A and x by feature
F , and E is any proposition that is compatible with X and admissible with
respect to F .
Other examples of the superprincipal principle include other formulations of
the principal principle, the reflection principle (where X says that one’s ra-
tional credence in A at some future time t is x), and testimony principles
(where X says that an appropriate authority on A believes A to degree x).
The general point to be made is this: If one wants to depart from radical
subjectivism by constraining certain credences via some instance of the super-
principal principle then one needs to invoke the notion of defeat—that is, one
needs to consider whether proposition E is compatible and admissible.
Conditions 1 and 2 must hold because these conditions encapsulate core in-
tuitions about defeat. But then one needs to move to objectivism insofar as
one needs to accept applications of the principle of indifference that take the
form, ‘if E is a non-defeater and XE contains no information relevant to F or
that renders F relevant to A, then PðF jXEÞ ¼ 0:5’.
Note that some versions of the principal principle avoid explicit appeal to
the notion of defeat. For example, Meacham ([2010], p. 426) maintains that if
G grounds chance in the sense that it determines that the chance of A is x, then
PðAjGÞ ¼ x. However, one still needs to consider defeat in practice. This is
because one needs to be able to decide questions to do with grounding: one
needs to decide whether G determines that the chance of A is x in order to
apply this version of the principal principle. Suppose G is XE where it is
apparent that grounding proposition X determines that the chance of A is
x, and E is some other proposition. In order to decide whether G determines
that the chance of A is x, one needs to ascertain whether E is a defeater in this
context—that is, whether XE grounds a different chance to that grounded by
X. Conditions 1 and 2 then become pertinent and the principle of indifference
follows by the argument presented above, except with X interpreted as
grounding a chance claim rather than directly expressing it. So, while some










versions of the principal principle are not explicitly instances of the super-
principal principle as formulated above, they do implicitly need to appeal to
defeat and hence also lead to the principle of indifference.
2 Some Objections Met
One might try to undermine the above argument by endorsing the principal
principle while rejecting Condition 2.
One possible objection to Condition 2 proceeds by noting that there are
similar intuitively plausible principles that cannot hold:
Condition 3: If E is not a defeater and XE contains no information relevant
to F, then EðA!F Þ is not a defeater.
Condition 4: If E is not a defeater and XE contains no information relevant
to F, then EðF!AÞ is not a defeater.
As we shall see next, Condition 3 (Condition 4, respectively) can only hold in
general if PðA!F jXEÞ ¼ 1, (PðF!AjXEÞ ¼ 1, respectively), which is im-
plausible when there is no information relevant to F and the only information
relevant to A is the chance information X.
Proposition 3
Suppose that neither E nor EðA!F Þ are defeaters and that 0 < x < 1. Then
the principal principle implies that PðA!F jXEÞ ¼ 1. Equally, if EðF!AÞ is
no defeater, then PðF!AjXEÞ ¼ 1.
Proof
Note that ðA!F Þ  :ðA:F Þ. We have
x¼PðAjXEÞ ¼PðAjXE:ðA:F ÞÞPð:ðA:F ÞjXEÞþPðAjXEA:F ÞPðA:F jXEÞ:
Now, since PðAjXEðA:F ÞÞ ¼ 1, we have
x¼ xPð:ðA:F ÞjXEÞþ 1Pð:ðA:F ÞjXEÞ:
Hence, x 1 ¼ ðx 1ÞPð:ðA:F ÞjXEÞ and, therefore, 1 ¼ Pð:ðA:F ÞjXEÞ.
The proof of the second claim is similar. w
If Conditions 3 and 4 are as plausible as Condition 2 but cannot hold, then
this diminishes the case for Condition 2.
However, the intuitive appeal of Conditions 3 and 4 is illusory. The prop-
osition F!A rules out all the F:A worlds, and so provides information to
favour A over :A. Hence, it is by no means clear that EðF!AÞ should not be
a defeater. Similarly, A!F rules out the A:F worlds, and so favours :A over
A. But Condition 2 is not susceptible to this problem: A$ F favours neither
A nor :A since it rules out A and :A worlds in equal measure.










While this consideration may successfully undermine Conditions 3 and 4, it
does point to another possible objection to Condition 2. What if the A and :A
worlds that are ruled out by A$ F do not have equal measure, in terms of
subjective probability? If one gives higher prior probability to :AF than
one does to A:F , then A$ F does apparently favour A over :A.
Similarly, if :AF has lower prior probability than A:F , then A$ F appar-
ently favours :A over A. Thus it appears that EðA$ F Þ should be a defeater.
In defence of Condition 2, three points are pertinent: First, the principal
principle (or indeed any other instance of the superprincipal principle) con-
strains initial credences—there is no prior-to-initial credence function that can
play a role. Second, with any such principle it is important that whether a
proposition E is a defeater depends on characteristics of the proposition itself
and its relation to X and A and not merely on one’s initial credence function,
for otherwise the principle trivializes to PðAjXEÞ ¼ x unless PðAjXEÞ 6¼ x.
Thus Lewis was careful to characterize defeat in terms of compatibility and
admissibility, with admissibility depending very much on the nature of the
proposition E. Third, the antecedent of Condition 2 ensures that EðA$ F Þ
provides no evidential grounds to prefer :AF over A:F or vice versa; any
such preference is entirely arbitrary. Therefore, Condition 2 remains plausible:
there is nothing in EðA$ F Þ to defeat an application of the principal princi-
ple. Applying Proposition 2, Condition 2 precludes a subjective weighting that
favours one of :AF and A:F over the other, not the other way round.
Evidential considerations trump arbitrary subjective choice when determining
whether a proposition is a defeater.2
A third possible objection to Condition 2 is that it fails under a definition of
admissibility put forward by (Meacham [2010], p. 418). Meacham suggests
that E is admissible if and only if XE is logically equivalent to some disjunction
T1H1   TkHk, where each Ti is a complete chance theory that implies X,
that is, that the chance of A at time t is x, and each Hi is a complete history up
to time t of a world at which Ti holds. In particular, any proposition not
entailed by such a chance-history disjunction is inadmissible. Now suppose
that the chance of A is non-trivial, that is, 0 < x < 1. Then A must be a
2 The subjectivist might want to dig in here by insisting that initial credences, rather than features
of the propositions in question, decide defeat. (Joyce ([2010], pp. 300–1) appears to adopt this
sort of position, though from the perspective of imprecise probability.) The subjectivist might
argue that although such a view trivializes the principal principle, it still sheds some light on the
role of chance, and therefore serves a useful purpose. In response, note that the principal
principle is formulated in terms of compatibility and admissibility because it is expected to do
both things: to shed light on chance and to provide a substantive constraint on credence. If one
were to disavow this second goal and develop a version of the principal principle that offers no
substantive constraint on credence, one would be left with radical subjectivism. Thus our main
conclusion would still go through—such a position would fail to offer a viable middle ground
between radical subjectivism and objectivism. The same point can be made with regard to other
instances of the superprincipal principle, which are also intended as substantive constraints on
credence.










proposition about the future and so must A$ F . As Hume noted, the future
is logically independent of the past; thus, A$ F is inadmissible. According to
Meacham’s definition of admissibility, then, Condition 2 systematically fails.
Note, however, that this definition of admissibility is extraordinarily re-
strictive. If F is any contingent atomic proposition about the future then it
is deemed inadmissible. For example, the proposition ‘the sun will rise tomor-
row’ (F) is deemed to defeat an application of the principal principle with
respect to an unrelated proposition ‘it will rain this evening’ (A). This is not
only contrary to intuition—it is hard to see how F can trump the chance of A
in determining a reasonable initial credence in A—but it also violates
Condition 1, which, we argued, provably holds. Thus this objection to
Condition 2 throws the baby out with the bath water.
Having defended Condition 2 against three possible objections, we shall see
next that even if some new objection is found that tells against Condition 2,
this will not necessarily undermine the main conclusion of Section 1, namely,
that the principal principle (or any other instance of the superprincipal prin-
ciple) is in tension with subjective Bayesianism.
Suppose that some pathological Fs can be found that do not conform to
Condition 2—perhaps propositions that, although contingent and atomic, are
self-informative in the sense that such an F imposes some constraint on its own
probability.3 Even if one rejects Condition 2 as a general principle, it remains
plausible that at least some restricted version of Condition 2 will hold, that is,
it remains plausible that there is some natural sub-class of propositions F
(non-self-informative propositions, perhaps) such that EðA$ F Þ are non-
defeaters, when E is a non-defeater and XE contains no information relevant
to F. However, for each such non-defeater EðA$ F Þ, Proposition 2 forces
PðF jXEÞ ¼ 0:5. This leads to a version of the principle of indifference, albeit a
qualified version. That it implies any such principle of indifference is enough
to put the principal principle in conflict with subjectivism, that is, for our main
line of argument to go through.
On the other hand, to hold that Condition 2 fails more routinely—not
just in pathological cases—would indicate that the principal principle
admits so many counterintuitive defeaters as to render the principle itself
unviable.4
3 Consider, for example, the contingent atomic proposition ‘Fido is exploding’, where Fido refers
to an unseen dog. One might think that this proposition is self-informative, thereby violating
Condition 2, on the grounds that once one understands this proposition it is plain that it
should be given very little credence. Contrary to appearances, however, this proposition is
not self-informative; it is our background knowledge about dogs and the prevalence and dur-
ation of explosions that leads us to give it little credence. This is not, after all, a case in which
Condition 2 is violated, but rather one in which Condition 2 does not apply because background
evidence, E, contains information relevant to the proposition, F, in question.
4 Even granting Condition 2, it may be the case that the principal principle admits sufficiently
many counterintuitive defeaters as to be unviable. Here is an example: As before, X says that the
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chance of a positive a-test is 0.8, but now other evidence, E, which is not itself a defeater,
provides some grounds in favour of a positive f-test; PðF jXEÞ ¼ 0:8, say. One might think
that A$ F is a non-defeater, because it is compatible with both the evidence in favour of F
and the chance claim X. But it turns out that A$ F must be a defeater, contrary to any such
intuition. F is not a defeater by Proposition 1; if A$ F were also a non-defeater then by
Proposition 2, PðF jXEÞ ¼ 0:5, which contradicts the supposition that PðF jXEÞ ¼ 0:8. Other
examples of counterintuitive defeat are explored in detail by Wallmann and Hawthorne
([unpublished]). We leave it open here whether the principal principle is generally viable. Our
claim is a conditional one: if an instance of the superprincipal principle is viable, it favours
objective Bayesianism over subjectivism.
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